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The Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act, Act 94 of 1998 (TRANCRAA) is the first comprehensive legislation to reform
communal land tenure in South Africa. It aims to transfer land in 23 former coloured rural areas to residents or accountable local
institutions. The TRANCRAA process in Namaqualand holds lessons for wider processes of tenure reform, including the implemen-
tation of the proposed Communal Land Rights Act. This policy brief argues that the time, funding and institutional support required
to carry out tenure reform have been seriously under-estimated, and that reformed tenure rights are ineffective and vulnerable if
isolated from other entitlements such as training, finance and integrated development initiatives. A neo-liberal assumption that
property rights and markets by themselves will transform rural areas where people are in deep crisis due to unemployment,
corruption, food insecurity and HIV/Aids is ill-founded and dangerous.
Communal land tenure reform is probably the most intractable
part of  South Africas land reform programme. Whether in former
coloured reserves or homelands, insecure tenure is an aspect of
the persistent apartheid of space, assets and opportunities, hinders
economic development and leaves people vulnerable in
development processes (Kepe 2001; Lahiff 2001). An estimated 13
million people in the former homelands are still waiting for
legislative changes to make their land rights secure. The 1999 Land
Rights Bill was scrapped after opposition from various quarters. In
August 2002 the government published the draft Communal Land
Rights Bill (CLRB) for public review, leading to threats of  violence
from some traditional leaders who see reform of the current system
as a challenge to their power base. Addressing the legacy of gender
inequality remains a major challenge (Claasens 2003; Meer 1997).
TRANCRAA aims to transfer ownership of 23 rural areas
covering 18 000km2 in four provinces to residents or accountable
local institutions and is the first comprehensive tenure reform in
the special areas created for apartheids oppressed and dispossessed
groups. Moving beyond permit-based and authoritarian state
control, the Act honours human and constitutional rights by
mandating people to decide future land ownership, by requiring
that their historical and current use rights be respected, and by
requiring that land governance be democratic and non-
discriminatory. TRANCRAA represents negotiated legal reform
and could be said to epitomise the South African way.
TRANCRAA has important implications for the
implementation of  the CLRB. Experience with implementation
of the Act to date reveals that:
! links between tenure reform and development are weak or absent
! local government is reluctant to support land management in
communities opting for communal property associations
(CPAs) and has no formal obligation to provide services to
people outside municipal township areas
! the process of consultation and participation demands time,
skill and resources
! preparing and enforcing appropriate land management plans
presents a major challenge to government and community
institutions
! recording and mapping family and individual user rights is
essential but requires a high degree of transparency and
community involvement in order to avoid appropriation of
common land by powerful individuals
! conflicts over control of communal land by vested interests,
including local government, deeply affect the tenure reform
process
! protecting and enhancing the rights of vulnerable groups
requires special attention throughout the tenure reform process.
Tenure reform in Namaqualand
TRANCRAA grew out of popular pressure and civil society advocacy
during and after the struggle against apartheid. The Act was drafted
through a consultative process in the mid-1990s to pass through
Parliament and be signed into law in 1998. The prescribed transitional
phase of TRANCRAA was implemented in the six rural areas of
Namaqualand from January 2001 to January 2003. After a delayed
tender process, in October 2001 the Department of Land Affairs
(DLA) selected the experienced land NGO Surplus People Project
(SPP) as the official facilitator of the process. From November
2002 to January 2003 referenda over land ownership were held in
five of the six areas (SPP 2002a). Based on reports by SPP and the
municipalities involved, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs
must make the final decision about the transfer of land.
The main aim of TRANCRAA is to provide for the transfer
of certain land to (a) a municipality; (b) a communal property
association (in terms of  the CPA Act, Act 28 of  1996); or (c) another
body or person approved by the Minister. The transfer of land
applies to the so-called Act 9 Area used in common by the
community and held in trust by the state, but not to township
areas, which will continue to vest in the municipality (except
residential plots, to which people may register private title).
TRANCRAA provides resources to record and map family and
individual use rights, including resolving of conflicts, and may
therefore build on a diversity of rights to land rather than assuming
uniform and equitable rights. It explicitly defines the accountability
of a municipality to the right-holders, should it become the owner
of the land (Box 1).
TRANCRAA allows for a process of facilitation and awareness
building. Locally nominated or elected transformation committees
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played a key role in carrying out the tasks of the transitional phase,
in co-operation with meent (commonage) committees (established
earlier to assist municipalities with managing the new farms acquired
through the land redistribution programme). SPP had to deliver
both adult education (for lawyers, politicians and developers with
no knowledge about the Act) and basic democracy training for
residents. Together with the local committees they prepared and
published regulations regarding livestock and cropland
management. Working with professional surveyors they recorded
family claims to cropland based on historical use, which proved to
be a dynamic and problematic process of negotiating rights and
boundaries. Tenure reform turned out to require time, resources
and skills beyond the imagination of even experienced facilitators.
Activities proceeded through monthly meetings between SPP and
transformation committees, quarterly loods (pilot) committee
meetings (bringing together DLA, municipalities and SPP for a
review of progress and decision making), community consultations,
plus a series of crisis management meetings at various levels.
The Act leaves open the means of expressing the community
preferences and the decision to hold advisory referenda was arrived
at through consultation between SPP and the transformation
committees. From November 2002 to January 2003, community
referendums were held in five of the six areas (due to conflicts,
Komaggas did not vote). People voted on three ownership
alternatives: 1) CPA, 2) municipality or 3) option of  own choice
(including trust ownership and individual title).
The results show a majority for CPAs in four of  the five areas
(Table 1). Few people voted for the own choice option (1%). A
majority for the CPA option was pronounced in Richtersveld (94%),
where community mobilisation had been vigorous as a result of
court cases dealing with land claims, and where a CPA was already
formed. Excluding Richtersveld, the results are almost evenly divided
between CPA (50%) and municipality (47%), showing a close race
in divided communities. The African National Congress (ANC) at
district and municipal level campaigned in favour of municipal
ownership, arguing that only publicly-owned commons could expect
state support in future. SPP tried to appraise the options in a balanced
way but also stressed arguments in favour of  municipal ownership.
Residents generally rejected individual of commons as impractical
and socially irresponsible: the term eienaarskap (ownership) has
strong cultural connotations and is more associated with community
than government. This attitude was reinforced when people saw
the redistribution farms deteriorate because the municipalities did
not maintain them, while users on short-term lease contracts had
few incentives to repair existing infrastructure. The referendum
victories for CPAs may also express a distrust of  municipalities for
failing to deliver on past election promises.
Although the Act recognised a range of tenure options, the
referendum could not capture the differences between tenure practices
in the old communal areas and new redistribution farms, or whether
people would have preferred special tenure arrangements for family
dryland plots and irrigation gardens. The referendum turnout of
around 35% of  registered voters might suggest that many are not
active land users or the common perception that past consultation
processes such as those on minerals and municipal demarcations
were effectively ignored. Some thought that having to vote only for
a CPA or for the municipality offered little real choice. CPAs were
known to have a poor track record around the country and the
municipal option would merely shift ownership to a lower and
poorer level of the state.
New municipalities
The demarcation of new municipal boundaries in the run-up to
the local government elections of 2000 was a blow to the
TRANCRAA process. From 1995 to 2000 the boundaries of the
transitional local councils coincided with those of  the reserves as
geographical and social units. Today, the new enlarged municipalities
include Act 9 areas as well as privately owned farms and large
towns. For instance, the Nama-Khoi Municipality (Springbok)
includes the three former reserve areas of  Komaggas, Steinkopf
and Concordia, about 16 000 people and 6 300km2 of communal
land. To meet the costs of  servicing such vast areas and scattered
people, municipalities are trying to increase the collection of rates
and taxes, something resisted by residents of the rural areas.
TRANCRAA could have simplified the institutional complexity
that communities face as users of old Act 9 land, new farms
(managed by the municipalities in which they fall) and promised
state farms. Residents were informed through a newsletter that all
these lands could be transferred to the entity of  peoples choice
following the referendum (SPP 2002b). This was in accordance with
a government notice in terms of the Local Government: Municipal
Systems Act of 2000. A senior DLA official confirmed that it was
Table 1: Results of community referenda on land ownership
  Mun. % CPA % Own % Spoilt % Total
Leliefontein 526 59 % 327 37 % 5 1 % 31 3 % 889
Richtersveld 42 4 % 939 94 % 2 0 % 17 2 % 1 000
Pella 271 42 % 375 53 % 1 0 % 6 1 % 653
Concordia 183 44 % 221 53 % 1 0 % 14 3 % 419
Steinkopf 922 45 % 1 074 52 % 22 1 % 46 2 % 2 064
Total 1 944 39 % 2 936 58 % 31 1 % 114 2 % 5 025
Box 1: Extract from TRANCRAA on municipal
accountability
A municipality:
1. Must afford residents a fair opportunity to participate
in the decision-making processes regarding the
administration of the land;
2. Must not discriminate against any resident;
3. Must give residents reasonable preference in decisions
about access to the land;
4. Must not sell or encumber the land, or any substantial
part of it, without the consent of a majority of residents
at a public meeting called for that purpose;
5. Is accountable to the residents;
6. Must manage and record effectively all financial
transactions regarding the land; and
7. Has fiduciary responsibilities in relation to residents.
Source: TRANCRAA, section 4
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the intention that all the lands should be included in the same
transfer process. This became a contentious issue during October-
November 2002, when the municipalities of Khâi-Ma and Nama-
Khoi chose not to follow SPP and DLA advice to include the new
farms in the TRANCRAA process. This happened so late that,
apart from ANC leaders, voters in Pella and Concordia assumed
that the new farms were included. Those leaders in Pella who
advocated CPA ownership, and won the referendum, were
incredulous when they learnt this and said it would cause uproar
among those supporting the CPA option. The only municipality
that won the referendum, Kamiesberg (Leliefontein), had included
the new farms in the referendum in line with SPP advice.
The state and the new commons
TRANCRAA offered an exceptional opportunity to re-design the
system of common property management. However, DLA did
not appear to be committed to supporting a new system of
community-based governance and TRANCRAA offered no
development assistance. Asked about the uncertainty of future
institutional support, a SPP facilitator responded by saying the
only thing that is for certain... there is not going to be any support!
Former DLA employees who had worked with tenure reform
expressed frustration about the lack of resources for adequate
implementation, service provision and sustainable development
after the transfer of land. TRANCRAA is a chance for the state to
bail out, said a lawyer from the Legal Resources Centre.
Whereas tenure reform was intended to complement and
support land redistribution, during the late stages of TRANCRAA
implementation insecurity and uncertainty actually increased. State-
owned farms approved for transfer to Act 9 communities have
remained under the control of the provincial government and thus
unaffected by TRANCRAA. In late 2002, NGO staff expressed
fear that publicity around the commercial potential of state farms
allocated to Pella residents could tempt bureaucrats to explore joint
ventures with commercial developers instead of completing the
transfers. In another area, a commercial project on community land
disregarded the land rights local people held under both apartheid
legislation and TRANCRAA.
Leaders advocating local government ownership argued that
CPAs would be treated like the private farm sector, exacerbating
peoples fear of  isolation, additional property taxes and institutional
conflicts. Political leaders suggested that municipal ownership would
protect people against losing land after mortgaging it for loans and
would secure access for vulnerable groups such as women, small
stockowners and the infirm. While central government is interested
in divesting itself of land and financial responsibilities, local
government showed considerable resistance to handing over, most
likely because of the role land plays in patrimonial governance by
politicians closely involved in commercial activities in agriculture,
tourism and mining.
From tenure reform to transformation
TRANCRAA refers neither to the obligations of the Constitution
to provide legally secure tenure nor to the governments goal of
transforming South African society. Some are relieved to be spared
the gloss and praise a slim action-oriented Act. Others feel a reference
to the constitutional commitment to social change would have
been appropriate. The lack of vision is liable to affect such a process
if people are not sure what the legal reform is actually trying to
achieve. Fairness in property relations is a function of capabilities
and achievements rather than simply access to resources such as
land. Tenure reform is vulnerable if  isolated from a broader process
of social change and only contributes to restructuring the patterns
of property and opportunity if people can substantially enhance
existing livelihood practices (such as livestock farming), enter new
ones (such as grape cultivation) and expand into other economic
sectors. When farmers in Pella start to export dates and grapes from
their currently barren lands on the Orange River, their new rights
will make a material contribution to their families and to the national
economy. But they are receiving little support to acquire the skills,
financial resources and appropriate technology that may enable them
to do so. Without these, the less powerful, particularly women, will
be left behind.
Tenure reform becomes irrelevant when people cannot use their
rights to enhance their productive capabilities or when only a few
are empowered to exploit the endowments of  many. A neo-liberal
celebration of property rights as a factor of change per se
underestimates how much individual and social capabilities depend
on collective responsibility and action, and plays down the impact
of power relations on how people use and benefit from new rights.
Arguments in favour of private property (individual, group or
corporate) assume that individuals become more motivated and
capable by having such rights but also that other enabling conditions,
such as investment, will materialise once the property rights have
been corrected. However, these are the links that are the most
contested in the fierce competition for resources in areas like
Namaqualand where municipalities experience that available
resources do not match devolved responsibilities (Hart 2002). The
process of transformation must therefore link land to human
entitlements including education, market conditions, technology
and public support. Tenure reform should strengthen, not abandon,
the commitment to transform the legacy of the colonial and
apartheid past with its racist and patriarchal human rights violations.
Policy lessons
TRANCRAA provides a flexible legal framework that can adapt to
the diversity of  conditions and needs of  the 23 Act 9 areas. Its
brevity and openness are virtues which commend it in relation to
the more prescriptive and detailed approach of  the CLRB. However,
to move beyond the states current approach of  getting rid of
liabilities requires political leadership and consideration of the basic
values and purpose of the reforms. TRANCRAA is a sensible Act
but it lacks a proper policy to support its implementation.
TRANCRAA and the CLRB share the ambition of transferring
land to communities, implying that rights are handed from one
owner to another. However, the process should be about creating a
new system of governance with a mix of adaptable and open-
ended rights rather than a narrow concept of ownership (Cousins
2002). The use of the concept community within each of these
debates is also problematic because there is rarely such an easily
defined unit to take charge of  land governance. Workable
arrangements to negotiate and find productive and just solutions
to diverse interests and potentially divisive conflicts might be
attainable if the institutions which take charge of transferred land
are given power and capabilities that go beyond land and link
them to appropriate levels of local governance.
Stakeholders
The dynamic and mature relationship between Namaqualand
communities, SPP and Legal Resources Centre is probably unique
and therefore hard to reproduce. On the other hand, in
Namaqualand there was no social movement to co-ordinate the
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different areas and put pressure on government and other
stakeholders. To some extent the ruling ANC at district and local
level fulfilled this function, but it was slow to mobilise around the
land tenure issue and ultimately did so with little consultation and
debate. The role of municipalities, as both interested parties and as
key implementers of the reform, was problematic. Quarterly loods
committee meetings ensured a degree of co-ordination between
major stakeholders but a broader stakeholder forum involving
business, neighbouring farm owners and other government
departments could have been useful to pursue development
opportunities created by tenure reform.
Power
Power struggle is inherent in land governance; power relations shape
the impact of tenure reform and create local winners and losers.
One must consider what capacity people under the pressures of
poverty, HIV/Aids and food insecurity have to influence and derive
benefits from new land rights and protect themselves against
corruption. TRANCRAA did not realise the constitutional right to
comparable redress for people who failed to gain, or even lost out,
from the process. Many vulnerable households continue to derive
little or no benefits from land because they have neither the money
to buy livestock nor the labour to work the land. Incapacity to
participate in a tenure reform process may easily translate into a loss
of rights for rapidly expanding groups of vulnerable households,
including those headed by children and old people.
Resources
SPPs budget for facilitating the TRANCRAA process in
Namaqualand was about R1 million per year for the two-year
transitional period 20012002. In addition, the state incurred
expenses for the surveying of  family croplands and for its own
limited involvement. The total financial expenditure by the state
may be in the region of R3 million or about R100 for each of the
30 000 inhabitants of the six Namaqualand rural areas. The budget
has been tight, and was further constrained by rising petrol prices.
Tenure reform in the former homelands of  South Africa is going
to be far more demanding due to the size and complexity of the
populations, areas and institutional structures. If we assume
substantial economies of scale, and efficient DLA-NGO
partnerships, it may be possible to do the job for 50% of the per
capita cost that was incurred in Namaqualand. Even under this
optimistic scenario, tenure reform in the homelands is likely to
require expenditure of at least R650 million  two thirds of the
total annual land reform budget. It is questionable whether South
Africa wants to invest this much in communal land tenure reform,
and currently budgetary allocations are clearly not sufficient.
Although the CLRB promises to provide institutional support,
where the funding for this will come from is far from clear. The
TRANCRAA experience in Namaqualand shows that both
institutional support and adequate funding are essential to the
tenure reform process.
By and large, communities affected by TRANCRAA in
Namaqualand live in municipal townships and will therefore
continue to receive municipal services. Many communal areas
throughout South Africa, however, are dispersed across communal
areas and not aggregated in villages: the CLRB does not make any
provision for continued service provision to such communities
after transfer. Transferring title from the state to private owners
also implies transferring responsibility for desperately-needed water,
electricity, sanitation and other services. Communal tenure reform
is going to be a major test case for the South African developmental
state, and there are good grounds for warning against any approach
that attempts legal reform in isolation from other forms of support.
Context and follow-up
TRANCRAA became most meaningful when local people started
exploring and planning new ventures that they felt were facilitated
by tenure reform. This in turn led them to identify other constraints
that needed to be overcome. It is unreasonable to load the challenge
of poverty eradication onto the tenure reform process alone. Property
rights are not the solution to all problems, nor do they exist in a
policy vacuum. Coupled with support for democratic local
governance and enterprise development, legally secure tenure may
help people enhance their properties and incomes. Judged by the
experiences in the contested commons of Namaqualand, it will
take many workshops, debates, backstage meetings, compromises,
surveys, plans and good ideas to make tenure reform happen and
contribute to healing the divisions of the past.
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